Using panel data of 68,800 small and large …rms, I examine whether …rms are subject to shifts in the supply of credit over the business cycle. Shifts in the supply of credit are identi…ed by exploring how …rms substitute between commitment credit -lines of credit -and non-commitment credit. I …nd that …rms on average rely more on commitment credits when monetary policy is tight and when the …nancial health of banks is weaker. The results are consistent with a bank lending channel of monetary policy and with shifts in the supply of credit following deteriorations in banks'balance sheets.
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Introduction
The …nancial crisis has highlighted the need to understand what governs the availability of credit in the economy. Research to understand the role played by …nancial intermediaries in the business cycle has intensi…ed. This paper uses …rm-level data to investigate whether …rms in general are subject to shifts in the supply of bank credit over the business cycle. In other words, do banks vary the conditions under which they o¤er credits to …rms by more than what is implied by changes in the creditworthiness of …rms or changes in the central bank policy rate?
Theories which allow for frictions in …nancial markets predict that this is the case. 1 According to the traditional bank lending channel of monetary policy, a tightening of monetary policy drains reserves from the banking system and induces banks to cut back on their lending, given that raising external funds is costly to banks. However, in recent models of the bank lending channel, this direct impact of monetary policy on bank reserves and credit supply is downplayed. Instead, shifts in the supply of credit is tied to the health of the …nancial intermediaries and in particular to the capital of the intermediaries. 2 Accordingly, the link between monetary policy and bank lending runs via the e¤ect of the interest rate on the balance sheets of the banks and thereby on the premium they pay for external …nancing. 3 As shown by Woodford (2010) in a simple macroeconomic model which allows for frictions in …nancial markets, a decrease in aggregate economic activity decreases the value of intermediaries' assets, and hence their net worth. This results in less borrowing by the intermediaries, and hence a cutback in the supply of credit. Clearly, not just monetary policy but any disturbance that a¤ects banks'net worth will shift the supply of bank credit in this type of model.
Over the years, there has been ample empirical research devoted to identifying the bank lending channel and the occurrence of shifts in the supply of credit. Early empirical work on the bank lending channel focused on the correlation between aggregate output, bank debt and indicators of monetary policy (e.g. Bernanke and Blinder (1992) ). It was commonly di¢ culty in these type of studies to disentangle shifts in the supply of credit from shifts in credit demand. Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) handled this identi…cation problem by examining relative movements in bank loans and commercial paper after monetary shocks. The intuition was that a monetary shock that operates through the standard interest rate channel lowers the demand for all types of …nance, while a monetary shock that operates through a bank lending channel a¤ects the supply of bank debt only. Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox found that the amount of outstanding bank loans declined relative to the outstanding stock of commercial paper after a monetary contraction, which seemed to suggest the existence of a bank lending channel. However, Rudebusch and Oliner (1996) pointed 1 See for instance Bernanke and Gertler (1995) for a review of this literature. 2 See for instance Woodford (2010) and Disyatat (2011) . 3 Boivin, Kiley and Mishkin (2010) labels this "the bank capital channel" as distinct from the traditional bank lending channel.
2 to the fact that there might be a compositional shift in credit demand in recessions. If large …rms are less severely hit in a recession and therefore demand relatively more credits than small …rms, this could explain the relative increase in the issue of commercial paper, since most commercial papers are issued by large …rms.
In line with Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) , Becker and Ivashina (2010) examine …rms' substitution between bank credit and public debt to identify shifts in bank-loan supply, but use …rm-level data instead of aggregate loan data. They study both how changes in monetary policy and changes in banks' …nancial health a¤ect …rms' …nancing choices. The study is naturally limited to large …rms, for which the issue of public debt is an available means of …nancing. They …nd evidence that …rms substitute bank loans for bonds at times characterized by high levels of non-performing loans, low bank share prices and periods of tight monetary policy.
The idea in this paper is to use a contractual di¤erence across bank credits to test for credit supply e¤ects in a sample of both small and large …rms. Firms applying for bank credit may seek either a commitment contract or a term loan. A commitment contract is a line of credit under which the …rm is entitled to borrow up to a certain pre-set ceiling and at conditions set in advance.
A term loan allows the …rm to sign a loan contract as the need arises and with terms set on the spot. When banks aim to tighten credit conditions, they are free to reduce the supply of term loans, i.e. loans not under commitment. But their possibilities for reducing the supply of loans under commitment are more limited. In this way, loan commitments may protect …rms from a credit contraction, as argued by James (2009) .
The approach to use the distinction between commitment and non-commitment loans has been explored by Morgan (1998) and by Black and Rosen (2007) . Using aggregated bank lending data, Morgan found that tighter monetary policy slowed the growth of loans not under commitment relative to loans under commitment. Black and Rosen examined detailed loan origination data and found no signi…cant evidence that the number of non-commitment loans decreased relative to commitment loans when monetary policy was tight. Instead, when analyzing loan maturities, they found that banks reduced the maturity of loan originations during periods when the fed funds rate was high. The e¤ect was a gradual reduction in loan supply, as predicted by the bank lending channel.
In this study, I use …rm-level data to examine how …rms substitute between commitment loans and non-commitment loans. The bene…t of using …rm-level data is that it addresses concerns about compositional changes in the set of …rms raising debt. It also enables me to control for …rm-speci…c factors that are likely to in ‡uence …rms'…nancing decisions. In line with Becker and Ivashina, I employ several measures of credit conditions at the macro level: the central bank policy rate, the level of bank credit losses as a percentage of total bank lending and a bank stock market index. The outline is the following. Section 2 describes the data set I use and discusses some data limitations that need to be handled. Section 3 provides information on the characteristics of lines of credit and on their use by Swedish corporations. Section 4 presents the empirical set up and my results. Section 5 concludes.
The data
The study is conducted on a large panel data set of Swedish …rms, aktiebolag. Aktiebolag is by approximation the Swedish equivalent of US corporations and UK limited liability businesses.
The population of …rms is collected from the Swedish credit bureau, Upplysningscentralen. The complete micro data is an unbalanced panel of approximately 340,000 Swedish …rms. The credit bureau collects and compiles annual balance sheet and income statement data from the Swedish Companies Registration o¢ ce. As a result, the data covers in principle all registered Swedish corporations, both public and private.
A di¢ culty when using accounting data is that the accounting years do not necessarily coincide with calender years. Only around half of the …rms in the panel have an accounting year that corresponds to the calender year. I deal with this by converting the annual report data into quarterly observations by interpolation. That is, I assume that the variables remain constant over the quarters in a given reporting period.
The time period studied is 1997 to 2009. The time span is limited by the availability of data on …rms'credit lines. Prior to 1997, …rms'reporting on credit lines is poor. New, more extensive, accounting standards that conform with EU directives came into e¤ect in 1996. According to the current accounting recommendations, a loan in the form of a revolving credit should be reported on the liability side of the balance sheet and the amount awarded should be reported in connection with the outstanding debt or in a note. As a result, as of 1997, data on …rms'credit lines is much improved.
Nevertheless, it remains a problem that …rms do not always report whether they have a line of credit or the used amount under an existent credit line. According to the accounting data, on average over the time period, only 41 percent of Swedish corporations had access to a line of credit.
This is an unrealistically low share. I draw this conclusion by comparing with other studies (Su… However, this time span is arguably too short to study the use of credit lines over the business cycle. To cover a longer time period, I will use the accounting data in the estimations and restrict the sample to …rms which have reported lines of credit in their annual accounts. However, to the extent that there is a systematic di¤erence between …rms which have a line of credit but have not reported so and …rms which reported their lines of credit, my results may be unrepresentative.
To get an appreciation of this potential sample selection problem, I make use of the bank lending data to conduct a formal analysis of which factors determine whether …rms make use of bank lines of credit. I estimate a probit model of the likelihood that a …rm has a line of credit according to this data set. I then compare this result with similar estimations using the accounting data but excluding all missing observations in this data set. The results, which are presented in table A1 in the appendix, show that, to a large extent, the same …rm-speci…c variables determine the likelihood that a …rm has access to a line of credit in both samples. For instance, the likelihood that a …rm has a line of credit decreases with size of the …rm and with the volatility of its cash ‡ow. I draw the conclusion that there is no severe systematic di¤erence between the population of …rms which choose to report their lines of credit and the population of …rms which actually have a credit line.
In addition to restricting the sample to …rms which have reported their credit lines in their annual accounts, I make the following additional adjustments of the sample. I remove observations which have unrealistic values for some variables, for instance negative debt. With the aim of excluding inactive corporations, I also require that the annual reporting of the …rm is consecutive, that the …rm has reported an operating income each year and that it has at least one employee.
For each …rm, I also remove the …rst year which the …rms occurs in the panel in order to delete observations with lines of credit negotiated in the current period. Finally, I remove …rms belonging to the …nancial sector. After these removals, the sample comprises 68,800 corporations.
It is worth noting that the population of Swedish corporations is dominated by small …rms; the median corporation has 4 employees and total assets of 2.4 million SEK (0.4 million USD). Some summary statistics of the sample of …rm are presented in table 1.
3 The use of credit lines
Banks have traditionally provided liquidity insurance in the form of loan commitments to …rms. Gatev and Strahan (2006) argue that synergies in lending and deposit-taking have provided banks with a natural hedge against market-wide declines in liquidity. Deposit in ‡ows have tended to increase during periods of market stress. Thereby, funding has been more available to banks just when borrowers have wanted to draw funds from their loan commitments. This hedge has reduced the cost of supplying liquidity when the corporate sector's liquidity demand has risen.
From a …rm's perspective, lines of credit o¤er an option on future liquidity. Relative to cash, they have the advantage that they provide liquidity only when needed, i.e. when valuable investment projects arise. In most cases, holding cash funded by a term loan is costly as cash yields a return that is lower than the interest rate paid on the debt to fund it (Demirouglu and James (2011)).
In 6 correlation between cash ‡ow and the access to a line of credit visible in the Swedish data.
The negative impact of asset size and cash ‡ow on the probability that a …rm has a line of credit is con…rmed by the formal probit estimations referred to earlier and reported in The potential of …rms to borrow via their lines of credit is substantial. On average, the committed amount of a line corresponds to around 30 percent of …rms' total assets and around two times the total of the outstanding bank debt of the …rm. 5 Figure 3 shows that smaller …rms on average have larger lines of credit in relation to both total assets and total outstanding bank debt. 
Results

Empirical speci…cation
The identi…cation of a bank lending channel in this study rests on the assumption that lines of credit and term loans are substitutable forms of …nancing for …rms: when credit conditions are tightened, either as a result of monetary policy and/or a deterioration of banks balance sheets, banks shift the supply of credit inwards. As the conditions for commitment loans are already negotiated and cannot easily be altered, …rms have an incentive to protect themselves from the credit contraction by increasing their demand for commitment loans, i.e. drawing more on their lines of credit. An increase in the share of commitment loans over total loans following a monetary tightening or deteriorating …nancial health of banks is therefore evidence in favor of a bank lending channel.
In reality, there will be heterogeneity among …rms as regards their incentives to substitute between di¤erent kinds of bank credit as larger …rms also have the option to turn to the securities markets for …nancing. To the extent that this option is feasible and preferred for …rms, it may make it harder for me to …nd the evidence I am looking for. In the extreme case where all …rms would use this alternative, a credit tightening would not change the share of commitment loans relative to non-commitment loans. Instead the share of commercial papers and corporate bonds would increase relative to the volume of bank credit. However, as the sample of …rms I examine is dominated by small …rms, most …rms in the sample are unlikely to have access to the securities markets. Hence, for these …rms, the only trade-o¤ possible in terms of credit is likely to be between di¤erent sources of bank credit.
The equation I estimate is of the following form:
where
, and C it are commitment loans (drawdowns on lines of credit) by …rm i in period t and N it is non-commitment loans (term loans) of the same …rm in the same period.
Z is a vector of control variables. I use the following …rm-speci…c control variables: the log of total assets, the log of property, plant and equipment, the return on assets (de…ned as operating income before depreciation divided by total assets), leverage (de…ned as the sum of short and long term debt to total assets), the share of tangible assets (de…ned as property, plant and equipment, 8 liquid assets and accounts receivable to total assets) and the share of liquid assets (de…ned as cash and short term assets to total assets). To handle that x it and the variables in Z it may be co-determined, all control variables are lagged four quarters. D it is a vector of three indicator variables: whether the …rm is part of a group, whether it pays dividends in period t and a sectorial 
Core results
I estimate (1) using OLS regression with …xed e¤ects. Standard errors have been corrected for heteroscedasticity and correlation in the cross-section by clustering by quarters. In addition to estimating over the full sample of …rms, I run regressions where I condition on …rms'raising new bank debt in the current period. This is similar to Becker and Ivashina (2010) . A rationale for this separation is that, in the full sample, the share of commitment loans over total bank loans may increase not only as …rms draw more on their lines of credit but also as …rms pay back on their term loans, transactions which may not be the result of relative cost changes. Table 2 presents the results of equation (1) where the macro variables are the three di¤erent measures of monetary policy and banks'…nancial health described above.
As regards the …rm-speci…c variables, the table shows that on average the share of borrowing in the form of commitment loans relative to total bank loans declines as the …rm grows in terms of total assets. The reliance on funding in the form of commitment loans relative to non-commitment loans also decreases with growing …xed assets such as properties, plants and equipment and a growing share of tangible assets to total assets. The share of commitment funding is also lower when …rms pay dividends, a result that may suggest that …rms with satisfactorily liquidity rely less on lines of credit in their …nancing. Furthermore, it seems to be the case that the reliance on commitment loans declines with pro…tability, measured as return on assets. However, the marginal impact of increased pro…tability is small and in the sample limited to …rms with a positive credit demand it is not signi…cantly di¤erent from zero.
Turning to the variables of main interest in this study, the macro variables, table 2 shows that in all three speci…cations the macro variables have a signi…cant impact on the relative share of commitment loans for the average …rm. A tighter monetary policy, as measured by a higher real central bank policy rate relative to trend, and a higher share of loan losses for banks covaries with a higher share of commitment loans. A higher share of commitment loans also covaries with a lower bank valuation. The results hold for both the full sample and the sample limited to …rms with a positive credit demand.
The quantitative impact is such that one standard deviation rise in the real interest rate increases the share of credit line …nancing by 0.3 percentage points on average. The impact of a decline in bank valuation is similar, while the impact from an increase in banks' loan losses is somewhat lower: a one standard deviation rise in loan losses increases the share of commitment loans by 0.2 percentage points.
Overall, the results in table 2 are consistent with the hypothesis that the credit supply shifts inwards in periods of tight monetary policy and when the …nancial health of banks deteriorates.
However, the quantitative impact appears to be small on average.
So far, I have implicitly assumed that …rms'relative demand for commitment loans and noncommitment loans does not vary over the business cycle. Consequently, business cycle variations in credit demand are no concern. However, it is conceivable that lines of credit and term loans are to some extent used for di¤erent purposes. It may for instance be the case that, when monetary policy is tightened in a boom and …rms'investment demand increases, so does their demand for term loans relative to lines of credit. If this is the case, separating shifts in the supply of credit from the demand impact remains a concern. The estimate of 1 will then be biased. To deal with this, I will also estimate equation (1) I control for the demand impact on monetary policy by two means. In the …rst set-up, I use a measure of monetary policy constructed as the deviation in the repo rate from a target level predicted by a Taylor rule. In the second measure, the residual of monetary policy is calculated using an extended set of demand related variables. In addition to the standard variables in the Taylor rule, I also include the deviation in industrial production from trend and the unemployment rate. By including additional demand variables, I want to make sure that I isolate a monetary policy term which is cleansed from any correlation with aggregate demand. I use the same extended set of demand variables to control banks'loan losses and banks'stock valuation from demand in ‡uences.
(See the appendix, section A2, for details.)
The results of these estimations are shown in table 3. Also, when I control for demand variation over the business cycle, the results show that …rms on average have a higher share of commitment loans over total bank loans when monetary policy is tight and when banks' …nancial health is weakened. The coe¢ cients remain statistically di¤erent from zero in most set-ups. 
Robustness tests
In this section, I present several tests to check the robustness of the above results.
One concern is the possibility that it is mainly small …rms that experience shifts in the credit supply and that the macro e¤ect is negligible. Since the sample is dominated by small …rms, I
would still expect to get signi…cant coe¢ cients for the macro impact. To examine that this is not the case, I re-estimate equation (1) Another concern is that, when studying the substitution between di¤erent types of bank credit, the distinction between the bank lending channel and the broad credit channel is not clear-cut. This is not an issue when studying …rms'substitution between bank credit and market …nancing as in Kashyap, Stein and Wilcox (1993) . Firms'switching to non-bank credit can then be taken as evidence of changes in banks'credit conditions (the bank lending channel). But an increase in the share of commitment credit could potentially be caused by a deterioration in …rms'…nancial positions with a subsequent increase in the cost of non-commitment bank loans (the broad credit channel). In the estimations above, I included several …rm-speci…c variables with the aim of capturing changes in the …rms'…nancial position. However, to the extent that these variables are insu¢ cient measures of the …nancial conditions of …rms, it could still be the case that the broad credit channel is a¤ecting my results. Therefore, as an additional check of the possible impact of the broad credit channel, I also run regressions where I divide the sample of …rms into three groups according to asset size. As the broad credit channel commonly is assumed to a¤ect small …rms more than large …rms, a tightening of credit conditions should reduce access to non-commitment credit relatively more for small …rms. 6 The results of these estimations over di¤erent size groups of …rms, presented in table 6, do not support the existence of a broad credit channel. There is little evidence that small …rms are more prone to increase their demand of commitment credit during periods of tight monetary policy and weaker banks'balance sheets. On the contrary, the coe¢ cients of the macro variable increase with asset size in three of the speci…cations. However, as the sample of …rms is dominated by small …rms, …rms in the …rst tercile of …rms are very small and even …rms in the second tercile are small by international standards. As displayed in table 1, the median …rm in the second tercile has an asset size of 2.5 billion SEK (0.4 billion USD) and 4 employees. It may therefore be more relevant to compare in particular the second tercile with the third tercile of …rms when searching for a di¤erence in impact between small and large …rms. But neither in such a comparison is there any clear evidence that larger …rms are less likely to substitute away from non-commitment credit when monetary policy is tight or banks'balance sheets are weakened. In three of the columns, the coe¢ cient is lower for …rms in the third tercile compared to the second tercile. But in another three columns, the coe¢ cient is higher for …rms in the third tercile.
In table 7, I examine whether my results are robust to measuring monetary policy conditions with a short-term market interest rate instead of the central bank policy rate. In normal times, the spread between the short-term market interest rate and the policy rate is fairly constant and, accordingly, it should be unimportant which interest rate is used in the estimations. However, during the …nancial crisis, the spread between the interbank rate and the Swedish policy rate, the repo rate, rose. As a result, the cost of using lines of credit did not follow monetary policy as 7 It should be noted that the lower degree of statistical signi…cance from the …nancial crisis period is not unexpected from a statistical point of view. In the estimations, standard errors are clustered by quarter to take into account possible correlation between …rms within a given quarter. When estimating over only the …nancial crisis, the number of clusters (quarters) will be low compared to the overall sample size and the standard errors are likely to be substantially larger than the OLS results. Potential problems with inference in the presence of group e¤ects when the number of groups is small have been highlighted by Donald and Lang (2001) . 8 The measures to facilitate the supply of credit included loans by the Riksbank to the banks at longer maturities than usual. The Riksbank also o¤ered loans in US dollars to Swedish banks and extended the possibility to borrow using mortgage bonds as collateral.
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Conclusions
This study uses a comprehensive sample of small and large …rms to examine whether …rms are subject to shifts in the supply of credit over the business cycle. This is done by studying how …rms substitute between commitment and non-commitment bank credit. The hypothesis is that, Table Notes : This table reports some summary statistics of the sample of …rms used in the estimations. Total assets are expressed in SEK billion. Bank debt is the sum of shortand long-term debt to credit institutions. Commitment credit to total credit is drawdowns on lines of credit in relation to the sum of drawdowns and term loans. Each variable is reported for the full sample of …rms as well as for the …rst tercile (small …rms), second tercile (medium-sized …rms) and third tecile (large …rms). The terciles are based on asset size. Table Notes: This table reports estimates from panel regressions explaining the …rm-level share of commitment loans over total bank loans between the …rst quarter of 1998 and the last quarter of 2009. All regressions include …rm …xed e¤ects, sectorial dummies and a time trend. Test-statistics reported in parantheses are based on heteroskedasticity consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering by quarters. The three columns to the left present results from estimations over the full sample of …rms. The three columns to the right present results from estimations over a sample which in each period is restricted to …rms raising new bank debt in that period. The columns labeled "Monetary policy" show the impact on the share of commitment loans from changes in monetary policy. Similarly, the columns labeled "Loan losses" and "Bank index" show the impact from changes in banks' loan losses and in banks'stock valuation. Details on the de…nitions of the macro variables are given in the appendix, section A2. Table Notes: This table reports estimates from panel regressions explaining the …rm-level share of commitment loans over total bank loans between the …rst quarter of 1998 and the last quarter of 2009. All regressions include …rm …xed e¤ects, sectorial dummies and a time trend. Test statistics reported in parantheses are based on heteroskedasticityconsistent standard errors adjusted for clustering by quarters. The four columns to the left present results from estimations over the full sample of …rms. The four columns to the right present results from estimations over a sample which in each period is restricted to …rms raising new bank debt in that period. The columns labeled "Monetary policy" show the impact on the share of commitment loans from changes in monetary policy. Similarly, the columns labeled "Loan losses" and "Bank index" show the impact from changes in banks' loan losses and in banks'stock valuation. Details on the de…nitions of the macro variables are given in the appendix, section A2. Table Notes: This table reports weighted least squares estimates of the …rm-level share of commitment loans over total bank loans between the …rst quarter of 1998 and the last quarter of 2009. Weights are set according to the relative asset size of the …rms. All regressions include …rm …xed e¤ects, sectorial dummies and a time trend. Test statistics reported in parantheses are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering by quarters. The three columns to the left present results from estimations over the full sample of …rms. The three columns to the right present results from estimations over a sample which in each period is restricted to …rms raising new bank debt in that period. The columns labeled "Monetary policy" show the impact on the share of commitment loans from changes in monetary policy. Similarly, the columns labeled "Loan losses" and "Bank index" show the impact from changes in banks' loan losses and in banks' stock valuation. Details on the de…nitions of the macro variables are given in the appendix, section A2. Table Notes: This table reports weighted least squares estimates of the …rm-level share of commitment loans over total bank loans between the …rst quarter of 1998 and the last quarter of 2009. Weights are set according to the relative assets size of the …rms. All regressions include …rm …xed e¤ects, sectorial dummies and a time trend. Test statistics reported in parantheses are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering at …rm level. The four columns to the left present results from estimations over the full sample of …rms. The four columns to the right present results from estimations over a sample which in each period is restricted to …rms raising new bank debt in that period. The columns labeled "Monetary policy" show the impact on the share of commitment loans from changes in monetary policy. Similarly, the columns labeled "Loan losses" and "Bank index" show the impact from changes in banks' loan losses and in banks' stock valuation. Details on the de…nitions of the macro variables are given in the appendix, section A2. ? ? ? Table Notes : This table reports the coe¢ cients of the impact of the macro variables on the …rm-level share of commitment loans over total bank loans between the …rst quarter of 1998 and the last quarter of 2009. The sample of …rms has been divided into three groups based on the size of the …rms'total assets. The sample is split at the 33th and the 66th percentile. The arrows indicate the macro variables for which the coe¢ cients increase when going from the tertile of the smallest …rms to the largest …rms. The question marks indicate where there is no monotonicity in the coe¢ cients over the asset size groups of …rms. All regressions include …rm …xed e¤ects, sectorial dummies and a time trend. Test statistics reported in parantheses are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering by quarters. Table Notes: This table reports estimates explaining the …rm-level share of commitment loans over total bank loans as a function of the interbank rate and …rm-speci…c variables between the …rst quarter of 1998 and the last quarter of 2009. Column I and II are results of estimations for the full time period. In columns III and IV the time period is restricted to the …nancial crisis period, de…ned as 200709 -200912 . In columns II and IV the interbank rate has been controlled for aggregate demand impact in the same manner as the repo rate in previous tables. Details on the de…nitions of the macro variables are given in the appendix, section A2. All regressions include …rm …xed e¤ects, sectorial dummies and a time trend. Test statistics reported in parantheses are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering at …rm level. Table Notes: This table reports the …rm-level share of commitment loans over total bank loans between 1998 and 2009. The underlying quarterly panel data has been transformed to annual data by using only …rm-level data as of the fourth quarter each year. All regressions include …rm …xed e¤ects, sectorial dummies and a time trend. Test statistics reported in parantheses are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering by date. The columns labeled "Monetary policy" show the impact on the share of commitment loans from changes in monetary policy. Similarly, the columns labeled "Loan losses" and "Bank index" show the impact from changes in banks'loan losses and in banks'stock valuation. In columns (2), (3), (5) and (7), the macro variables have been controlled for aggregate demand impact. Details on the de…nitions of the macro variables are given in the appendix, section A2. Table Notes: This table reports estimates from panel regressions explaining the …rm-level share of commitment loans over total bank loans between the …rst quarter of 1998 and the second quarter of 2007. All regressions include …rm …xed e¤ects, sectorial dummies and a time trend. Test statistics reported in parantheses are based on heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors adjusted for clustering by quarters. The …rst three columns present results from estimations where the macro variable is a measure of monetary policy. In the fourth and the …fth columns the macro variable is a measure of banks' loan losses and in the last two columns the macro variable captures banks'stock valuation. Details on the de…nitions of the macro variables are given in the appendix, section A2. Table Notes: This table reports Table Notes: This table reports results from probit regressions where the dependent variable takes the value 1 if the the …rm has a line of credit in the current period. Columns (I) to (III) report the estimated marginal e¤ects of …rm characteristics on the probability of having a line of credit from probit estimation using the bank lending data. Columns (IV) to (VI) report corresponding results based on the accounting data. The dotted line is the residuals of the following estimated equation:
where (indprodt indprod t ) is the deviation in industrial production from trend and ut is the unemployment rate. The trend in industrial production has been estimated by means of the Hodrick-Prescott …lter. Figure A2 . Measure of banks' …nancial health: loan losses as a percent of total lending
The thick solid line shows total loan losses in each period for the four dominant Swedish banks. Loan losses are expressed as a percent of total bank lending according to:
where LLt is loan losses in period t as reported in the banks'quarterly reports and Lt is bank lending in period t.
(Source: The Riksbank.)
The thin solid line is calculated in the same way as in equation A2. That is,the residuals in: Figure A3 . Measure of banks' …nancial health: ln(bank index)
The thick solid line in …gure A3 is the log of a bank stock index and the thin line is calculated in the same way as in equation A4. 
